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Since Derrida died in 2004 a series of books has come out, commemorating the 
radical thinker‘s greatness. In their collections of essays and monographs 
friends, colleagues, and contemporaries trace the different concepts of the 
Derridean thought, following the (impossible) paths of his argumentation.2 
Remarkably, all of the ‗homage‘ books are characterised by a unique feature – 
by a melancholically mournful tonality.  
As an ―impossible‖ closure, as a coda, of a forty-year friendship, Joseph 
Hillis Miller published ‗his‘ homage-book, For Derrida, with its title echoing 
Derrida‘s Memoires for Paul de Man, which was written after the death of his 
‗other‘ Yale-friend, de Man. Thus, it is supposed to be a ‗friendly‘ book 
composed in grief, together with the inevitable intimacy of such a context. The 
blurred photo on the cover, showing the two aged friends travelling on a train, 
reaffirms such a ‗closeness‘, while it also hints at a possibility of a journey. 
Actually, Miller‘s ‗memoires for Derrida‘ starts with mourning and ends in 
mourning but in-between it offers the reader – the gentle and patient reader – a 
highly exciting intellectual (de)tour, if he or she is interested in philosophical or 
literary critical issues.  
On the one hand, Miller presents the ‗late‘ Derrida‘s concepts in his rather 
complicated twelve essays, which were composed after Derrida‘s death between 
2005 and 2007, with the exception of the first that was written in 2004. On the 
other hand, he tries to show how these concepts are applicable in literary studies 
and criticism; and, first of all, as he claims in ―Preface‖, his main aim is to 
encourage the readers to read, or re-read, Derrida (xvii-xviii). Here Miller, as a 
good guide, highlights the two most important drives in Derrida‘s writings (and 
probably the two most important keys to the understanding of his writings); 
namely, his death-drive and his ‗other‘-drive.  
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The first and shortest chapter, ―A Profession of Faith,‖ does not only 
describe the entry of Derrida and deconstruction into the States, together with 
the first encounters of the two friends, but it also explores the Derridean notions 
of ―unconditionality‖ and ―sovereignty,‖ while introducing such central ideas as 
the promise, the event and the wholly other. In Acts of Literature Derrida defines 
literature as the domain of unconditionality, being characterised by the openness 
towards the other and its (im)possible coming. Here Miller, the distinguished 
critic and professor of English literature, accepting the unconditionality of 
literature, declares his own ‗profession of faith‘: ―When I as a reader or teacher 
respond to the wholly other as embodied in a literary work and try to mediate it 
to my students or to my readers of what I write, I am, perhaps, just ‗perhaps,‘ 
fulfilling my professional duty to put everything in question‖ (8).  
The next essay, ―Who or What Decides, for Derrida: A Catastrophic Theory 
of Decision‖ (which is also written in the Millerian ‗ethics of reading‘3) focuses 
on the concept of decision, textually on his ―Force of Law‖. Apart from 
discussing the topic in the context of the Austinian speech act theory, Miller 
elaborates on the Derridean distinction between law and justice, and on the 
incongruity between decision and knowledge. Our actions are ruled by laws but 
―justice obliges us to decide;‖ however, making a just decision is ‗mad‘ as we 
must decide about the future and for the future (23-5). In this chapter, the 
complexity of Miller‘s book is revealed in the immense amount of allusions and 
references – besides to Derrida‘s works, also to Austin, Kierkegaard, Levinas, or 
Proust, James, Carroll, Montaigne etc. On the other hand, going beyond the 
difficulty of understanding, the reader can enjoy the way Miller ironically 
juxtaposes philosophical, political and literary examples. Nevertheless, placing 
George W. Bush‘s decision to invade Iraq next to Isabel Archer‘s dilemma (viz. 
whom to marry) really makes the reviewer think about the ―unconditionality‖ of 
criticism. 
After the two ethical chapters, the third is about Derrida‘s ―destinerring‖ 
(―Derrida‘s Destinerrance‖), where the central question is what will happen to 
Derrida‘s oeuvre. Derrida is/was destined to wander and he was so 
characteristically doing it in all of his writings and seminars – thanks to his ‗bad‘ 
or ‗good luck‘, being expressed in the same pronunciation of mes chances and 
méchance (36). In Derrida‘s complex rhetoric, in his wandering sentences, the 
reader can encounter how language falls upon us by chance, where this ‗us‘ is 
problematic as well. Moreover, deconstruction should be understood as ―to 
allow the other to come or to announce its coming in the opening of this 
dehiscence‖ (46). Miller emphasises the importance of Derrida‘s ideas on 
telepathy because it is ―another name for the communication at a distance that 
Derrida came to call or demand of the wholly other‖ (48). It is obvious that 
Miller is interested in the different ways of (tele)communication and technology 
and his frequent mentioning of the Net, wikis, iPods, Macs, and cell phones is in 
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accordance with the ‗demand‘ of the 21st century.4 However, he also frequently 
refers to Derrida‘s aversion of the Internet; for instance, due to his fear of data-
loss, he refused to write e-mails though he was a ―demon typist‖ (261).  
In the fourth chapter, ―Late Derrida,‖ Miller quotes from his friend‘s last 
interview, which he gave, being aware of his dying of pancreatic cancer in the 
summer 2004: ―I live my death in writing‖ (59). The crucial word, death, 
resonates not only throughout the entire interview but the whole oeuvre. In his 
writings – starting with Aporias and The Memoirs of the Blind through Glas and 
Spectres of Marx to The Gift of Death and Demeure: Fiction and Testimony 
(only to mention the most famous works) – death is thematised. After listing the 
compulsory references, Miller chooses to speak about the Derridean death-drive 
and the revenant, analysing a seminar of the (still) unpublished ‗late‘ work, The 
Beast of the Sovereign (Two), giving the quotations in his own translation and 
the French original in endnotes.5 It is the right time for the reviewer to praise the 
precision and accuracy that characterise the book. Inescapably, the essays are 
full of quotations – how can a book be written ‗for Derrida,‘ not allowing 
Derrida to speak? The reviewer cannot help expressing her admiration, having 
found the seven-page list of Derrida‘s abbreviated works at the beginning, the 
fascinating Index at the ending of the book and the exact references and witty 
endnotes throughout.  
In ―Late Derrida‖ in a really enjoyable and lucid way Miller discusses, 
more exactly, he is closely reading, what Derrida says about Defoe‘s Robinson, 
who has just found the naked footprints in the sand on the island. Miller gives a 
quotation in full length, where Derrida imagines Robinson‘s exaltation in a style 
that is analogous to a jazz-riff or a Bachian fugue: ―Is it I? Is it my track? Is it a 
specter of my print, the print of my specter? Am I in the process of returning? 
Am I or am I not a ghost, a revenant? a revenant of myself which I cross on my 
path as the trace of the other, on a path which is already a path of return and of 
coming back, etc.?‖(59) Crusoe‘s fear that he is running after his death recalls 
Heidegger‘s definition of man as ―being toward death‖ (Sein zum Tode), while 
his fear of being haunted by himself, or of encountering himself as the wholly 
other, alludes to the Freudian unheimlich. As ‗for Derrida,‘ who claimed to have 
thought about death everyday, writing was meant as speaking of death, while the 
waterfall of words were to keep death away – for a while. 
In the next chapter, in ―Derrida‘s Remains,‖ again the death drive and the 
future of the legacy are examined by Miller – this time with a main focus on the 
word, reste, meaning bodily and textual ‗remains‘ (cf. the corpse and the 
unpublished writings). As the reader can expect, reste should be discussed with 
the concepts of restance, the trace, and ―archivization‖. Miller calls attention to 
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the most striking (very Derridean) idea of Archive Fever; namely that, besides 
the desire of preserving, some ‗destruction drive‘ operates in the ‗evil‘ archive 
(viz. the original title, Mal d‟archive, 82). While Derrida, recalling Plato‘s fear 
of writing itself in Phaedrus, says, if something is safely stored, it can safely be 
forgotten; Miller emphasises such dangers of new technologies as, for example, 
hackers, bugs and viruses. Nevertheless, the reviewer would rather highlight 
Derrida‘s naming his own work as ―a strategic wager‖ and his definition of 
deconstruction in A Taste for the Secret: ―Deconstruction is not a method for 
discovering that which resists the system; ... in the reading and interpretation of 
texts, ... it has been a question of showing that a system does not work, and that 
this dysfunction not only interrupts the system but itself accounts for the desire 
for system‖ (87). In the same interview, quoted by the author, he also claims that 
in ‗his‘ deconstruction he has made efforts to go beyond language, to think the 
unthinkable and utter the unsayable about ―the wholly other‖ (89).  
The sixth chapter, ―Derrida‘s Enisled,‖ addresses the Derridean (anti-)concept 
of community. Although the opening hypotheses suggest a clear and straight-
forward argumentation with a reference to Heidegger‘s Dasein (‗being there‘) as 
Mitsein (‗being together‘), the definition of community as an ―agglomeration of 
solitaries‖ and Derrida‘s radically different views on these two ideas (101), the 
essay turns out to be one of the most (awkwardly) complicated ones. The author 
thinks, he has to tell everything about the concept of community before 
Derrida‘s entrée. Consequently, with the insertion of some Derrida-quotations, 
he flashes Walter Benjamin‘s, Raymond Williams‘s, Husserl‘s, Heidegger‘s, 
Levinas‘s, Lacan‘s, and Nancy‘s notions of community in order to reach his 
actual topic – after a nineteen-page introduction. The reviewer has to admit that 
this lengthy intro is thorough and exciting, though the reader should make an 
intellectual effort to get a taste and enjoy the ‗digressive‘ rhetoric of the 
argumentation. As for Derrida‘s concept of community, it radically denies the 
others‘ ideas, especially rejects the Heideggerian Mitsein, since Derrida 
emphasises that ―there is no world, there are only islands‖ (121). In Derrida‘s 
(world)view each and every human being is irremediably isolated, enisled, 
without any ―bridge, isthmus, communication‖; everyone is infinitely the 
―wholly other‖ with ‗its‘ secrecy and complete alterity (ibid.). In the presenting 
of Derrida‘s concept Miller mainly relies on the already analysed last seminar, as 
a result, the description of the ‗marooned‘ individuals is haunted by Derrida‘s 
own lines (cf. traces) written on Robinson Crusoe. Also in this essay the 
concepts of ―nonbelonging‖ and ―autoimmunity‖ are introduced but investigated 
in chapters 8 and 10. 
The seventh chapter is about ―Derrida‘s special theory of performativity,‖ 
as the title exactly states. Actually, it is the least convincing writing in the book. 
On the one hand, the chapter, similarly to the previous one, begins with the 
hypothesis-trick, here playing on the two senses of the word – performativity as 
speaking about a performance or a performative speech act. Then it gives a 
‗brief‘ seventeen-page overview of the different interpretations of the concept, 
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where Miller consults with some ‗outdated‘ article on Wikipedia (sic!), then 
with J. L. Austin, Judith Butler, Kafka, and Lyotard, before turning to the 
discussion of Derrida‘s ideas. To be honest, the geneology of the re-defined term 
Miller proposes; namely that Butler formulated her ―performativity theory‖ in 
Gender Trouble, having ―appropriated Derrida‘s modification of Austin‘s speech 
act theory‖ (probably with Lyotard in the background) is interesting but not 
convincing (145). Nevertheless, Derrida‘s questioning of the stable ego (‗I‘), 
being presupposed in the Austinian performatives, and his claiming that there is 
no innate selfhood and subjectivity as everyone takes roles in the ―iterability‖ of 
performatives (or would rather change due to the others‘ demands in every 
context), greatly influenced the Butlerian ‗engendered‘ performativity. On the 
other hand, chapter 7 also shows how the study of performativity – in both 
meanings – can be useful in the analysis of literary works. Miller provides a long 
digression on George Eliot‘s Daniel Deronda, which turns out to be a well-
written short essay within the lengthier one, though it is only forcefully and 
awkwardly related to Derrida‘s conception, mainly reflecting on his ideas on the 
promise and his Jewishness. 
The next chapter, ― ‗Don‘t Count Me In‘: Derrida‘s Refraining‖, can be 
read as a ‗light‘ intermezzo between the two previous rather difficult and the two 
forthcoming ethical and socio-political essays. Here, in the opening, Miller deals 
with the ―tantalizing and challenging‖ Derridean term of the aporetic ―third‖ 
(neither/nor, both/and), that is, ―the continually displaced middle‖ that 
frequently turns up in his writings (175-6). The chapter then speaks about the 
philosopher and teacher Derrida‘s ―nonbelonging,‖ even highlighting some 
biographical episodes; for instance, how he propagated the setting up of several 
revolutionary counter-institutions then turned against them. As Miller sees, in all 
of his ‗performances‘ Derrida insisted on refraining, sometimes even refused to 
react. In accordance with his ideas of being enisled and even heterogeneous to 
himself (cf. ‗Derridas‘), he claimed that he was ―not one of the family;‖ 
consequently, he was rather suspicious of any form of collectivity (187).  
Chapter 9 traces the concept of ―irresponsibilization‖ in two sections 
(―Derrida‘s Ethics of Irresponsibilization; or, How to Get Irresponsible, in Two 
Easy Lessons‖), how Derrida differentiates between the responsibility of 
universal ethics and the responsibility of absolute ethics, where the second type 
is destined to be understood as ―irresponsibility‖ by the standards of the first 
one. In the opening Miller deals with the ―secrets‖ of literature (―Literature in 
Secret‖) so as to bring his focus on a Biblical story of secrets, in which Abraham 
was called to sacrifice his own beloved son, Isaac. In The Gift of Death, 
following Patočka‘s and Kierkegaard‘s reading, Derrida makes Abraham the 
emblem of ―irresponsibilization,‖ who upon the demand of the (absolute) Other 
acts against, ‗sacrifices,‘ everyday ethical norms. Interestingly enough, this 
sacrifice is also performed textually because Miller feels to be condemned to 
comment on Derrida‘s commenting on the others‘ reading of the parable ―by 
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respeaking the words of the other or the words of an interminable string of the 
other‖ (207). 
Chapter 10 explores ―autoimmunity‖ and also intends to describe the 
‗political‘ Derrida (―Derrida‘s Politics of Autoimmunity‖). This chapter is 
‗mostly‘ American, so to say, with lots of references to such current happenings 
and events as the War of Terror following 9/11, the cock-up of Bushian politics, 
scientific and technological innovations with their potential dangers, and the 
recession. It is the most repetitive writing, although an almost 380-page book on 
Derrida written by the same author obviously cannot avoid repetitions (and for 
sure, it does not). What makes the chapter still informative on Derrida is that the 
events described are used to exemplify autoimmunity. Derrida is said to foresee 
that the self-protecting defence mechanisms of a social body will turn against 
themselves and become self-destructive (238); similarly, how after 9/11 the fear 
of terror generated greater fear and more terror.6 
The eleventh chapter titled ―Touching Derrida Touching Nancy‖ is about 
Derrida‘s highly complex book, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (Le toucher, 
Jean-Luc Nancy),a commentary on Nancy‘s works; more exactly, Miller tries to 
deal with the motif of ‗the hand‘ in Derrida‘s book. It is the right time for the 
reviewer to recommend reading, which is also frequently done by the author 
himself. It is the longest essay (sixty pages), where not only the ‗late‘ Derrida 
but also the ‗late‘ Miller is shown in their ‗prime‘. The reader encounters the 
abundance of wordplay, flourishing rhetoric and insultingly convincing 
argumentation. The Nancy-Derrida essay is a masterpiece of rhetorical close 
reading and the reviewer, only with great difficulty, can do without quoting the 
essay in full length, and can only (poorly) highlight the main, ‗presentable‘ ideas 
here.  
Before reaching his ―humanual‖ (cf. human and manus, ‗hand‘ in Latin) 
theme, Miller offers a digression on technicity, then describes Derrida‘s style 
(cf. stylus in Latin). The author, as a good critic, enumerates eight features of the 
―inimitable‖ Derridean hand: his usage of (otherwise Blanchotian) ―x without x‖ 
phrases; his ―unhanding‖ the boundaries between the literal and the figurative; 
usage of wordplays; putting everything in question; giving extravagant list of 
connected words or synonyms; his technique of ―micrological‖ reading with 
numerous even repeated citations and ironically insolent commentaries; ―the 
rhetoric of postponement‖; and his manipulations (cf. manus hidden in the word) 
of aporia and paradox (267-78). All of these features characterise his Nancy-
book, where his main aim is to deconstruct the Western concept of ―touch‖ from 
Aristotle through Husserl to Nancy, claiming that ―there is no ‗the‘ touch‖ 
(Nancy) and the ―immediacy and intimacy of touch never happens‖ (278). By 
the end of the essay, the reader must admit that no one can lay a hand on anyone 
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here: neither the writer, nor the critic, or the reviewer. Notwithstanding, in his 
―coda‖ Miller happily quotes from Nancy‘s Noli me tangere (cf. Touch me not), 
which he wrote after Derrida‘s death and in which he touches upon Derrida‘s 
―rabbinical‖ Le toucher, analysing primarily Renaissance paintings about the 
risen Christ and Mary Magdalene‘s encounter (301-303). 
Miller proposes mourning as a leitmotif, ―as a conspicuous and enigmatic 
thread‖ that runs through Derrida‘s work (309). The theme is actually introduced 
earlier in chapter 5 ―Derrida‘s Remains‖ (90-95), but it is elaborated in the last 
two essays. While the Nancy-essay is a strange kind of mourning text since 
Nancy survived his heart-transplant (he ―died and resurrected,‖ 292), the twelfth 
chapter titled ―Absolute Mourning‖ deals with – not only Derrida‘s but also 
Miller‘s – ‗work of mourning‘.7 In the interpretation of ―absolute‖, ―impossible‖, 
or ―pre-originary‖ mourning, Miller reveals that for Derrida mourning, since it is 
speaking about the sorrowful ―nonavailability of the other and myself‖ (320), is 
a ―universal condition of human existence‖ (324). In his discussion of the 
differences between mourning and melancholy, Derrida argues against that the 
two could be kept separate, undoing Freud‘s, Abraham and Torok‘s distinctions 
about the introjecting mourning and the incorporating melancholy (310). 
Moreover, he suggests that both of them, even the Freudian ‗normal‘ work of 
mourning with its introjection, betrays the other‘s otherness, while the ‗true(ly)‘ 
―impossible‖ mourning ―leaving the other his alterity, ... refuses to take or is 
incapable of taking the other within oneself‖ (95) – as Miller quotes Derrida 
from his Memoires for Paul de Man (95). 
Although mourning marks and frames the essay-collection, the reviewer 
does not intend to conclude in a doleful tone. Moreover, in his last interview 
Derrida himself puts emphasis on the survivor‘s duty: ―survival is an originary 
concept that constitutes the very structure of what we call existence, Dasein, if 
you will. We are structurally survivors, marked by this structure of the trace and 
of the testament. But, having said that, I would not want to encourage an 
interpretation that situates surviving on the side of death and the past rather than 
life and the future. No, deconstruction is always on the side of the yes, on the 
side of the affirmation of life‖.8 In his complex book Miller fulfils the survivor 
friend‘s duty, since in the essays Derrida‘s texts are kept alive and the reader – 
the frequently addressed ―dear reader‖ (e.g. 32., 121., 281., 297) – is invited to 
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join the journey and enjoy the Sternesque narration with its numerous 
digressions on philosophical and literary texts or of private anecdotes. 
Meanwhile, in the reading process, the Millerian-Derridean texts are ‗lively‘ 
destinerring and escape their ‗deadly‘ oblivion.  
 
  
 
